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21The 35 countries are: 1. Benin, 2.  Botswana, 3. Burkina Faso, 4. Burundi, 5.  Cameroon,
6.  Central African Republic, 7. Chad, 8. Congo, Democratic Republic, 9. Congo, Republic of, 10.
Cote D’Ivoire, 11. Ethiopia, 12. Gabon, 13. Gambia, 14. Ghana, 15. Guinea Bissau, 16. Kenya,
17. Lesotho, 18. Madagascar, 19. Malawi, 20. Mauritius, 21.  Mozambique, 22. Namibia, 23.
Niger, 24. Nigeria, 25. Rwanda, 26. Senegal, 27. Sierra Leone, 28. South Africa, 29. Sudan, 30.
Swaziland, 31. Tanzania, 32. Togo, 33. Uganda, 34. Zambia, and 35. Zimbabwe.
1. Introduction
A major argument against globalization is that it hurts poor people. Since most poor people live in
developing countries, proponents of anti-globalization defend their protestations as attempts to save
poor countries. In their counterargument advocates of globalization charge that most developing
countries are poor not because of globalization, but rather because of the poor quality of their
institutions and the equally poor governance such institutions provide. Stuck in the middle are
policymakers for Sub-Saharan African countries (SSACs). Literally here you have an appropriate
circumstance for the African proverb, “When two elephants fight, it is the grass beneath them that
suffers the most.” Yet, the experiences of SSACs are often cited in support of both the anti-
globalization and governance arguments, even though there is little to no comparative evidence of the
effects of globalization and governance on the economic performance of SSACs.
This paper estimates and compares the effects of globalization and governance on the economic
performance of 35 SSACs.1 The analysis utilizes a simple production function approach in which
economic activity depends on measures of globalization, governance, and some  controls. It finds that
globalization and governance significantly affect the performance of these countries, but different
measures of globalization and governance have different impacts. The effects of physical capital are
robust, while those of the health and education components of human capital tend to switch signs.
Based on the findings one can conclude that SSACs gain from increased globalization and improved
governance, but conventional factors and forces are important as well.
The structure of the paper is as follows: Section 2 briefly outlines the literature behind the empirical
set-up in Section 3. Section 4 presents the results and their implications for policy and further research.
The last section draws a tentative conclusion.
2. Sources of the recent economic performance of Sub-Saharan African countries
I argue that the recent economic performance of Sub-Saharan African countries (SSACs) has
depended on globalization, governance, and domestic resources serving as controls. 
2.1 Economic performance and globalization
Although globalization means different things to different people (see Dreher, Gaston, and Martens,
2008), there is now little doubt that it affects the economic performance of countries (Waters, 1995).
What Dani Rodrik (1997) calls “tensions” of globalization emanate from the magnitude and
3distribution of the gains from globalization. Citing Zimbabwe as an example Arne Bigsten and Dick
Durewall (2002) argue that poor policy pursuits against market integration, especially against
“increased exposure to international prices and returns on assets” (p.18) have led to the decline in
economic performance and globalization in Zimbabwe.
Axel Dreher (2003) does not only provide an excellent review of different angles to quantifying the
effects of globalization on economic performance, he also develops indices covering aggregate and
disaggregate aspects of globalization for 123 countries during the 1970-2000 period. His analysis
concludes that  “... globalization is good for growth [in the sense that] countries that globalized more,
experienced high growth rates” (p.14, [added]). In this conclusion the African countries of Rwanda
and Zimbabwe are among the least globalized, as well as poorest performing, countries. Dreher further
observes that these countries “have poor institutions which repress growth and promote poverty”.
Using Dreher’s methodology KOF now publishes globalization data annually, and one aspect of this
paper is to estimate and compare the effects on the economic performance of 35 SSACs of Dreher-
KOF globalization and governance as a measure of institutional quality. 
  
2.2 Economic performance and governance
In his presidential address to the American Economic Association Avinash Dixit (2009) observes that
“good governance is needed to secure three essential prerequisites of market economies: security of
property rights, enforcement of contracts, and collective action” (p. 5). Although Dixit also calls for
a better understanding of  how governance actually influences economic performance, before anyone
can recommend institutional reform, increasing evidence is already pointing to institutions and
institutional quality as essential elements of the growth of both output and resource productivity. This
is not all new since classical economists like Adam Smith (1973 [1776]), and new classical economists
like W. Arthur Lewis (1965), as well as contemporary theorists like North (1990), and Gradstein and
Konrad (2006) have touched upon the role in economic performance of institutions and institutional
quality. Aron’s (2000) review of the links between institutions and the economic performance of
developing countries (see Table 1, pp. 108 - 113) demonstrates that countries with “good” institutions
tend to do better than countries without or with “bad” institutions. What remains controversial is how
to quantify the effects of institutions. Some experts, like Sachs and Warner (1997), and Bloom and
Sachs (1998) use geography to describe institutional effects on growth, while others turn to proxies
like constitutions, political freedoms and social justice. 
In all this controversy, governance has emerged as the preferred indicator among other measures of
institutional quality - which justifies what now is called the Kaufman, Kraay, Zoido- and Mastrzzi
(KKZM) index of governance (Kaufman and Kraay, 2008). Quibria (2006, p. 104), for example, shows
that the KKZM composite correlates positively with the economic growth of a number of Asian
countries. The World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) is the most comprehensive of
the 18 or so common indices of governance (see www.worldbank.org/wbi/governance/). It covers 212
countries and territories over 1996-2006, and it has six dimensions: (a) voice and accountability, (b)
political stability and absence of violence, ( c) government effectiveness, (d) regulatory quality, (e) rule
of law, and (f) control of corruption. All six dimensions, individually and collectively, can
4make a statement about economic performance. For instance, where the rule of law is absent or weak,
property rights will be fragile, markets dysfunctional, and economic performance most likely
unsustainable (Acemoglu, Johnson and Robinson, 2002).
In October 2006, the Mo Ibrahim Foundation at Harvard University’s Kennedy School of Government
released its own Mo Ibrahim African governance index (MIGI). Based on 2005 data, MIGI expands
on a similar series for 2000 and 2002, and covers 48 countries. The compillers and financier of the
MIGI claim that it is geographically more comprehensive than similar indices, and addresses biases that
afflicted competing indicators like the WGI. (http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/index/).
2.3 Economic performance and domestic resource controls
The focus of this paper is on globalization and governance. However, in estimating the effects on
economic performance of globalization and governance I use domestic resources as controls. Extant
literature on the primary sources of economic performance is vast and now well understood. It suggests
that pre-independence the growth of SSACs  was extensive growth, coming from the growth of labor,
land (mainly mineral and agricultural commodities), and fixed capital in agriculture, and mining and
quarrying (see Fafchamps, 2000, Amavilah, 1996). Tahari, Ghura, Akitoby, and Aka (2004) tell us that
the slow growth of most SSACs that occurred during the 1960-2002 years depended on the
accumulation of “objects” rather than “ideas”- to use Paul Romer’s lingo. Only Botswana, Equatorial
Guinea, Gambia, and Mauritius grew at rates exceeding four per cent per
annum over the same time period  (Basu, Calamitsis, Ghura, 2000, Acemoglu, Johnson, and  Robinson
(2001a, b, Amavilah, 2006). Overall capital accumulation contributed to growth more than labor.
Beginning c. 1997 the number of African countries with growth rates above four per cent more than
doubled. Tahari, Ghura, Akitoby, and Aka (2004) associate the recent growth with  improved
institutional quality, improved human capital, an improved macroeconomic policy environment, and the
broadening of the export base from a narrow range of commodities to semi-processed goods. Amavilah
(2006) presents evidence supporting the positive effects of macroeconomic policy on the performance
of 46 African countries in 2004/2005. Moreover, O’Connell and Ndulu (2000) and Ndulu and
O’Connell (1999) associate the performance of SSACs with capital accumulation, demographic
changes, policy, institutions, political (in)stabiliy, and total factor productivity (TFP), where TFP is
measured as dependent on the number of years of schooling. In that sense TFP is the same thing as
human capital (H). Drawing on Barro and Lee’s (1996, 2000) base dataset for the value of human
capital in economic performance, Benhabib and Spiegel (1994) show that most African countries lack
the critical mass of H stock required for fast-growing TFP.
3. Empirical framework
From both W. Arthur Lewis (1965) and Paul Romer (1990, 1993, 1994) it is clear that economic
performance depends on factors and forces. A number of forces underscore Africa’s growth and
decline. Key among them are technology and institutions, where technology is measured variously as
TFP and/or Solow residual (A), and institutions, often proxied by governance. In a recent paper Jean-
Claude Maswana (2006) associates poor performance of African countries with lack of technological
5innovation and its underlying knowledge, and bad policies. These matters can all be reasonably
accommodated in a production function model as the next subsection illustrates.
.
3.1 Model specifications
For a given state of technology (Ait), let the value of a production activity (Yit) depend on a vector of
domestic resources (Xit) serving as controls, and on another vector of state variables (Zit), so that over
time (t)
where I = 1, 2, 3, ..., M are SSACs, and t = 1, 2, 3 are time periods. From here let and
for Nit = population, Hit = human capital, Kit = physical capital, Z1t =  measures of
globalization, and Z2t = measures of governance. Hence, assuming (1) is multiplicative in form gives
Yit as
For neatness let’s drop the country (i) and time (t) indices, and follow Amavilah (2008a) in stating H
as a function of quality N, i.e.,
where q represents the education (literacy rate or years of schooling) and the health (life expectancy
at birth) dimensions of H. Also, if globalization and governance are significant to an economic activity,
one likely transmission channel is A. One can then argue that 
 Now plugging (3) and (4) into (2) and simplifying gives
The logarithmic N intensity of (5) is per capita gross domestic product (GDPPC = y)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
6where  and Then based on (6) the estimation equation is
defining 20 = constant, 21 = "( = effects of globalization and/or governance, 22 = $N = effects of the
education and health dimensions of H, 23 = (1 - " - $) = the effect of physical capital investment on
economic performance, and : = the error term. I use the OLS estimator to estimate (7), making the
usual adjustments for statistical problems. In this version of the paper, I do not drop globalization and
governance measures even when statistically insignificant.
3.2 Data and data sources
The dependent variable (y) is real GDP per capita in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP), drawn
from the Penn World Table (PWT) 6.2, where  it appears as “rgdptt.” Figure 1 shows that most
countries fall in the $2000 GDPPC range. Moreover, there are fewer and fewer countries as one climbs
the GDPPC ladder, of which Mauritius with a GDPPC of $16400 is the leader.
Variable (K, k) is a proxy for physical capital; it is gross capital formation as a percent of GDP. This
data is available in the IMF’s International Financial Statistics Yearbook (2007). Most SSACs spend
an average of 19% on gross fixed capital formation, not uncommon among developing economies, but
still at the lower end of K-formation in fast growing developing economies. Figure 2a is about this
variable.
Two q dimensions of human capital (H) are education and health. Health is measured as life expectancy
at birth (Life), and plotted in Figure 2b. Education (School) is the average years of schooling. When
data was missing the apparent average for Africa is used in its place (see Figure 2c).  Both the
education and health statistics came from World Development Indicators (WDI) reports, although such
data is widely available. Figure 2b shows that the health of these countries is clustered between 40 and
60 years, corresponding to a GDPPC of approximately $2500. Figure 2c reveals that countries with
under 10 years of schooling have an average GDPPC of only $2200. Beyond 10 years of schooling,
GDPPC more than doubles, and/or triples for some countries.
For governance = institutional quality (Z2) I use two different indicators of institutional quality: the
World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI) and the Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance
(MIGI).Again,  there are six dimensions for WGI as fully explained on
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp. I have added a simple average of WGI. This, like
other dimensions, lies in the -2.5 to 2.5 interval. Whenever necessary in this paper I shorten WGI
indices as follows:
(6)
(7)
7Fi
gu
re
 
1 
-
 
Re
a
l G
DP
 
o
f A
fri
ca
n
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s,
 
20
00
, 
20
02
, 2
00
7
4.
5
5.
5
6.
5
7.
5
8.
5
9.
5
2000
2002
2007
2000
2002
2007
2000
2002
2007
2000
2002
2007
2000
2002
2007
2000
2002
2007
2000
2002
2007
2000
2002
2007
2000
2002
2007
Ye
ar
Log GDP, US$
Lo
g 
GD
P
8Fi
gu
re
 
2a
 - 
Ca
pi
ta
l v
e
rs
u
s 
re
a
l G
D
P 
pe
r 
c
ap
ita
 
o
f A
fr
ic
a
n
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s,
 
20
00
, 2
00
2,
 
20
07
1
1.
52
2.
53
3.
54
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lo
g 
GD
P 
pe
r 
c
a
pi
ta
, 
US
$
Log percent capital investment
C
ap
ita
l
Li
n
e
a
r 
(C
a
pi
ta
l)
9Fi
gu
re
 
2b
 
-
 
H
e
a
lth
 
v
e
rs
u
s
 r
e
a
l G
DP
 
pe
r 
c
a
pi
ta
 o
f A
fr
ic
a
n
 
c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
, 
20
00
, 2
00
2,
 
20
07
3.
4
3.
5
3.
6
3.
7
3.
8
3.
94
4.
1
4.
2
4.
3
4.
4
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lo
g 
GD
P 
pe
r 
c
a
pi
ta
, 
US
$
Log Life expectancy at birth
H
ea
lth
Li
n
e
a
r 
(H
e
a
lth
)
10
Fi
gu
re
 
2c
 
-
 
Ed
u
c
a
tio
n
 v
e
rs
u
s
 
re
a
l G
DP
 
pe
r 
c
a
pi
ta
 
o
f A
fr
ic
a
n
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
, 
20
00
, 
20
02
, 
20
07
-
0.
50
0.
51
1.
52
2.
53 3
.5
4.
5
5.
5
6.
5
7.
5
8.
5
9.
5
10
.5
Lo
g 
GD
P 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
, 
US
$
Log years of schooling
Ed
u
ca
tio
n
Lin
ea
r 
(Ed
uc
a
tio
n)
11
Fi
gu
re
 
3a
 
-
 
W
G
I v
e
rs
u
s 
re
a
l G
DP
 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
o
f A
fri
ca
n
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s,
 2
00
0,
 
20
02
, 
20
07
-
3
-
2.
5
-
2
-
1.
5
-
1
-
0.
50
0.
51
1.
5 4
.5
5.
5
6.
5
7.
5
8.
5
9.
5
10
.
5
Lo
g 
GD
P 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
Measure of governance
Co
rr
up
tio
n
A
v
er
ag
e
Re
gu
la
to
ry
V
oi
ce
St
a
bi
lity
Ef
fe
c
tiv
e
n
es
s
Ru
le
Li
n
ea
r 
(A
v
er
ag
e)
12
Fi
gu
re
 
3b
 
-
 
M
IG
I v
e
rs
u
s 
re
a
l G
DP
 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
 
o
f A
fic
a
n
 
co
u
n
tri
e
s,
 
20
00
, 
20
02
, 
20
07
2
2.
53
3.
54
4.
55
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
Lo
g 
GD
P 
pe
r 
ca
pi
ta
, 
US
$
Measure of governance
A
v
e
ra
ge
Sa
fe
ty
Ru
le
Ri
gh
ts
Op
po
rtu
ni
ty
De
v
e
lo
pm
e
n
t
Li
n
e
a
r 
(A
v
er
a
ge
)
13
Fi
gu
re
 
4 
- K
O
F 
gl
o
ba
liz
a
tio
n
 
a
n
d 
re
a
l G
D
P 
pe
r 
c
a
pi
ta
 o
f A
fr
ic
a
n
 c
o
u
n
tr
ie
s
, 
20
00
, 2
00
2,
 
20
07
2
2.
53
3.
54
4.
5
4.
5
5.
5
6.
5
7.
5
8.
5
9.
5
10
.
5
Lo
g 
GD
P 
pe
r 
c
a
pi
ta
, 
US
$
Measure of globalization
Av
e
ra
ge
Ec
on
o
m
ic
So
ci
a
l
Po
lit
ic
a
l
Li
n
e
a
r 
(Av
e
ra
ge
)
14
b
 Documentation of this index sometimes uses human development and economic development
interchangeably. I take that for granted.
cIn previous studies I included regional dummies in (6), but the results were not
informative enough to warrant doing so here.
1. WGIcor = control of corruption
2. WGIreg = regulatory quality
3. WGIvoice = voice and accountability
4. WGIstab = political stability and absence of violence
5. WGIeff = government effectiveness
6. WGIrule = rule of law
7. WGIave = average WGI
There is considerable variation across indices and countries. Even so, the average quality of institutions
(WGIave) is positively related to GDPPC as Figure 3a indicates.
M I G I  s t a n d s  f o r  t h e  M o  I b r a h i m  A f r i c a n  G o v e r n a n c e  i n d e x
(http://www.moibrahimfoundation.org/index/). The index ranges from zero to 100%. Its dimensions
in the worksheet are:
• MIGIave = average MIGI
• MIGIsafe = safety and security
• MIGIrule = rule of law, transparency, and corruption
• MIGIrit = participation and human rights
• MIGIop = sustainable economic opportunity
• MIGIdev = human (economic ) developmentb
Like WGI, MIGI also varies a lot across countries; however, Figure 3b shows average MIGI
(MIGIave) increasing. 
Globalization (Z1) data are Dreher-KOF data available and explained at http://globalization.kof.ethz.ch/
and in Axel Dreher (2003). They come in one aggregate and three disagregates. The aggregate is called
the ‘Index of Globalization’ (aGlobe). The three disaggregates are the ‘Index of Economic
Globalization’ (eGlobe), ‘Index of Social Globalization’ (sGlobe), and the ‘Index of Political
Globalization’ (pGlobe).c  Figure 4 portrays the data.
4. Results
Estimation results are in Tables 1 - 4. For instance, Estimation 1.1 shows that the health dimension of
human capital (H) has a statistically insignificant positive effect on the economic performance of
SSACs. However, the largest influence on performance comes from the average measure of
globalization (aGlobe) and from WGIave (the average measure of WGI governance). Thus, per capita
GDP is highly elastic with respect to globalization and governance. A unit improvement in globalization
and governance increases per capita GDP by two-fifth of one percent.
15
Ta
bl
e 
1 
-
 
R
es
o
u
rc
es
, 
gl
o
ba
liz
a
tio
n
, 
a
n
d 
W
G
I g
ov
er
n
a
n
ce
, 
a
n
d 
th
e 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
pe
rf
o
rm
a
n
ce
 
o
f S
u
b-
Sa
ha
ra
n
 
A
fr
ic
a
, 
20
00
 - 
20
07
Pa
re
n
th
es
es
 
ar
e 
t-
v
al
ue
s 
at
 
5%
 
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
 
le
v
el
V
ar
ia
bl
e
Es
tim
a
tio
n
 
1.
1
Es
tim
a
tio
n
 
1.
2
Es
tim
a
tio
n
 
1.
3
Es
tim
a
tio
n
 
1.
4
C
on
st
a
n
t
1.
10
2(1
.1
37
)
0.
75
5(0
.6
45
)
2.
51
7(2
.3
83
)
1.
91
5(1
.5
54
)
C
on
tr
o
ls
•
Ca
pi
ta
l
•
Ed
uc
at
io
n
•
H
ea
lth
0.
12
9 
(1.
85
0)
0.
05
2 
(1.
35
1)
0.
03
8 
(0.
19
6) 
0.
14
3(2
.0
42
)
0.
17
7(4
.0
46
)
0.
25
6(1
.0
54
)
0.
26
6(2
.9
69
)
-
0.
01
8(-
0.
53
9)
0.
44
4(2
.3
84
)
0.
26
8(2
.6
19
)
0.
09
7(2
.0
93
)
0.
06
5(2
.8
52
)
G
lo
ba
liz
a
tio
n
•
A
v
er
ag
e
•
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
•
So
ci
al
•
Po
lit
ic
al
1.
52
8(1
1.
34
2)
1.
40
1(8
.8
57
)
0.
01
3(0
.0
76
)
1.
30
2(8
.9
28
)
-
0.
50
9(-
4.
65
9)
0.
10
8(0
.5
66
)
1.
15
1(7
.0
91
)
-
0.
53
7(-
4.
42
3)
G
ov
er
n
a
n
ce
 (W
GI
)
•
A
v
er
ag
e
•
R
eg
ul
at
o
ry
•
V
o
ic
e
•
St
ab
ili
ty
•
Ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s
•
R
u
le
 
o
f L
aw
0.
43
3(6
.6
77
)
0.
10
4(0
.9
99
)
-
0.
30
2(-
4.
11
90
-
0.
02
7(-
0.
54
7)
0.
67
5(5
.2
46
)
0.
21
5(1
.6
61
)
0.
20
7(2
.3
28
)
0.
21
9(2
.2
97
)
-
0.
13
6(-
1.
64
8)
-
0.
03
9(-
0.
75
8)
0.
62
7(5
.3
17
)
-
0.
16
0(-
1.
25
6)
Su
m
m
a
ry
 
St
at
ist
ic
s
•
B
u
se
 
R
-
sq
u
ar
e 
[R
aw
]
•
D
W
 
[D
]
0.
64
71
[0
.9
97
4]
1.
20
4[
-
0.
01
2]
0.
78
87
[0
.9
05
6]
1.
25
6[
-
0.
02
9]
0.
79
73
[0
.9
99
9]
1.
12
9[
0.
05
2]
0.
75
53
[0
.9
97
6]
1.
34
4[
-
0.
02
1]
16
Ta
bl
e 
2 
-
 
R
es
o
u
rc
es
, 
gl
o
ba
liz
at
io
n
, 
a
n
d 
M
IG
I g
o
v
er
n
a
n
ce
, 
a
n
d 
th
e 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 p
er
fo
rm
a
n
ce
 o
f S
ub
-S
ah
ar
a
n
 A
fr
ic
a,
 
20
00
 - 
20
07
Pa
re
n
th
es
es
 
ar
e 
t-
v
al
u
es
 
at
 
5%
 
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
 
le
v
el
 
V
ar
ia
bl
e
Es
tim
a
tio
n
 
2.
1
Es
tim
a
tio
n
 
2.
2
Es
tim
a
tio
n
 
2.
3
Es
tim
a
tio
n
 
2.
4
C
on
st
a
n
t
-
4.
57
7(-
3.
02
7)
-
4.
12
0(-
3.
99
4)
-
1.
07
1(-
0.
75
7)
-
2.
99
2(-
2.
48
9)
C
on
tr
o
ls
•
Ca
pi
ta
l
•
Ed
uc
at
io
n
•
H
ea
lth
0.
31
2(4
.5
19
)
0.
02
1(0
.5
05
)
0.
38
4(1
.6
74
)
0.
27
4(4
.4
28
)
-
0.
08
9(-
2.
84
7)
0.
29
1(1
.7
79
)
0.
28
9(3
.5
72
}
-
0.
01
4(-
0.
43
4)
0.
75
2(3
.6
59
)
0.
38
5(4
.5
19
)
-
0.
06
6(-
1.
83
85
)
0.
38
3(1
.7
35
)
G
lo
ba
liz
a
tio
n
•
A
v
er
ag
e
•
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
•
So
ci
al
•
Po
lit
ic
al
1.
35
6(9
.7
74
)
1.
17
2(7
.4
50
)
-
0.
07
1(-
0.
50
4)
1.
15
6(6
.6
10
)
-
0.
65
5(-
7.
86
9)
-
0.
02
1(-
0.
12
9)
0.
45
2(2
.5
02
)
-
0.
26
3(-
2.
66
2)
G
ov
er
n
a
n
ce
 (M
IG
I)
•
A
v
er
ag
e
•
Sa
fe
ty
•
R
u
le
 
o
f L
aw
•
R
ig
ht
s
•
O
pp
or
tu
n
iti
es
•
D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t
1.
07
7(3
.5
19
)
-
0.
43
4(-
3.
68
9)
0.
87
5(4
.7
17
)
-
0.
16
5(-
1.
57
6)
1.
31
2(9
.5
63
)
-
0.
17
3(-
0.
99
6)
0.
89
1(2
.6
50
)
-
0.
28
6(-
3.
20
1)
0.
99
9(6
.2
12
)
-
0.
15
4(-
1.
65
9)
1.
59
3(8
.6
06
)
-
0.
16
3(-
0.
90
2)
Su
m
m
a
ry
 
St
at
ist
ic
s
•
B
u
se
 
R
-
sq
u
ar
e 
[R
aw
]
•
D
W
 
[ D
]
0.
63
33
[0
.9
98
7]
1.
04
7[
0.
06
3]
0.
73
17
[0
.9
98
2]
1.
31
8[
-
0.
03
6]
0.
75
15
[0
.9
99
1]
1.
15
8[
0.
02
4]
0.
79
39
[0
.9
96
8]
1.
38
9[
-
0.
05
9]
17
Ta
bl
e 
3 
- R
es
o
u
rc
es
, 
a
n
d 
gl
o
ba
liz
a
tio
n
 
o
r 
W
G
I g
ov
er
n
a
n
ce
, 
a
n
d 
th
e 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
pe
rf
o
rm
a
n
ce
 
o
f S
u
b-
Sa
ha
ra
n
 
A
fr
ic
a
, 
20
00
 - 
20
07
Pa
re
n
th
es
es
 
ar
e 
t-
v
al
ue
s 
at
 
5%
 
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
 
le
v
el
V
a
ri
a
bl
e
Es
tim
a
tio
n
 
3.
1
Es
tim
a
tio
n
 
3.
2
Es
tim
a
tio
n
 
3.
3
Es
tim
a
tio
n
 
3.
4
C
o
n
st
an
t
7.
29
9(7
.63
3)
7.
31
7(6
.49
3)
-
2.
89
2(-
3.5
71
)
1.
72
8(1
.72
8)
C
on
tr
o
ls
•
Ca
pi
ta
l
•
Ed
u
ca
tio
n
•
H
ea
lth
0.
25
2(2
.42
4)
0.
18
1(3
.98
9)
-
0.
16
1(-
0.7
16
)
0.
13
1(1
.11
5)
0.
25
1(6
.03
7)
-
0.
09
8(-
0.3
52
)
0.
33
1(4
.35
6)
-
0.
00
6(-
0.2
58
)
0.
74
4(3
.91
7)
0.
28
2(2
.80
4)
-
0.
02
6(-
0.7
44
)
0.
45
6(2
.20
6)
G
lo
ba
liz
a
tio
n
•
A
v
er
ag
e
•
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
•
So
ci
al
•
Po
lit
ic
al
1.
65
4(1
1.7
18
)
-
0.
02
6(-
0.1
69
)
1.
30
8(9
.17
8)
-
0.
36
5(-
4.0
43
)
G
ov
er
n
a
n
ce
 (W
G
I)
•
A
v
er
ag
e
•
R
eg
ul
at
o
ry
•
V
o
ic
e
•
St
ab
ili
ty
•
Ef
fe
ct
iv
en
es
s
•
R
u
le
 o
f L
aw
0.
68
9(7
.56
)
0.
33
9(3
.10
5)
-
0.
23
9(-
2.6
09
)
-
0.
00
8(-
0.1
39
(
0.
71
7(4
.73
8)
0.
02
1(0
.01
36
)
Su
m
m
a
ry
 
St
at
ist
ic
s
•
B
us
e 
R
-s
qu
ar
e 
[R
aw
]
•
D
W
 
[ D
]
0.
51
70
[0
.99
88
]
1.
13
9[
0.0
46
]
0.
61
87
[0
.99
81
]
1.
17
7[
0.0
29
]
0.
68
01
[0
.99
92
]
1.
22
1[
0.0
27
]
0.
51
56
[0
.99
92
]
1.
26
4[
-0
.01
2]
18
Ta
bl
e 
4 
-  
R
es
o
u
rc
es
, 
a
n
d 
gl
o
ba
liz
a
tio
n
 
o
r 
M
IG
I g
ov
er
n
a
n
ce
, 
a
n
d 
th
e 
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
 
pe
rf
o
rm
a
n
ce
 
o
f S
u
b-
Sa
ha
ra
n
 
A
fr
ic
a
, 
20
00
 - 
20
07
Pa
re
n
th
es
es
 
ar
e 
t-
v
al
ue
s 
at
 
5%
 
sig
ni
fic
an
ce
 
le
v
el
V
a
ri
a
bl
e
Es
tim
a
tio
n
 
4.
1
Es
tim
a
tio
n
 
4.
2
Es
tim
a
tio
n
 
4.
3
Es
tim
a
tio
n
 
4.
4
C
o
n
st
an
t
-
2.
69
1(-
1.8
62
)
-
3.
30
0(-
3.0
16
)
-
2.
89
2(-
3.5
71
)
1.
74
8(1
.72
8)
C
on
tr
o
ls
•
Ca
pi
ta
l
•
Ed
u
ca
tio
n
•
H
ea
lth
0.
31
3(3
.22
2)
0.
01
8(0
.42
0)
0.
40
4(1
.73
4)
0.
46
0(6
.87
6)
-
0.
05
4(-
1.7
42
)
0.
22
5(1
.13
7)
0.
33
1(4
.35
5)
-
0.
00
6(-
0.2
58
)
0.
74
4(3
.91
7)
0.
28
2(2
.80
4)
-
0.
02
6(-
0.7
44
)
0.
45
6(2
.20
6)
G
lo
ba
liz
a
tio
n
•
A
v
er
ag
e
•
Ec
o
n
o
m
ic
•
So
ci
al
•
Po
lit
ic
al
1.
65
4(1
1.7
18
)
-
0.
02
6(-
0.1
69
)
1.
30
8(9
.17
8)
-
0.
36
5(-
4.0
43
)
G
ov
er
n
a
n
ce
 (M
IG
I)
•
A
v
er
ag
e
•
Sa
fe
ty
•
R
u
le
 o
f L
aw
•
R
ig
ht
s
•
O
pp
or
tu
n
iti
es
•
D
ev
el
o
pm
en
t
1.
84
3(5
.19
2)
-
0.
34
9(-
2.8
72
)
0.
97
3(6
.82
1)
-
0.
04
3(-
0.5
15
)
1.
65
9(1
4.7
90
)
0.
03
2(0
.21
4)
Su
m
m
a
ry
 
St
at
ist
ic
s
•
B
us
e 
R
-s
qu
ar
e 
[R
aw
]
•
D
W
 
[ D
]
0.
44
65
[0
.99
78
]
1.
05
3[
0.0
65
]
0.
76
07
[0
.99
85
]
1.
37
6[
-0
.06
1]
0.
68
01
[0
.99
82
]
1.
22
1[
0.0
27
]
0.
51
56
[0
.99
92
]
1.
26
4[
-0
.01
2]
19
At the disaggregate level the positive effect of WGIave breaks down into the positive effects of the
rule of law, government effectiveness, and the quality of the regulatory regime, as well as negative
effects of stability and freedom of expression. Ignoring the constant term, human and physical capital
are important to economic performance. Morever, when I disaggregate globalization and WGI
governance (Estimation 1.3),  it becomes clear that political globalization, voice, stability, and the
rule of law undermine the economic performance of SSACs.
Across Table 1 the effects of capital investment on economic performance range from 13% to 27% -
a range that includes the 19% average for SSACs. Aggregate H has a positive net effect on
performance, but as Estimation 1.3 shows, the effects of the education component of H are negative
whenever one considers disaggregate globalization and the WGI measures of institutional quality,
which are overwhelmingly strong. In the case of globalization, social globalization has the strongest
effect; political globalization is in fact negative. The regulatory quality of institutions, freedom of
expression, political stability and peace, and the rule of law have adverse impacts on the performance
of this group of SSACs.
In Table 2 economic performance depends on conventional factors and forces, globalization, and
MIGI measures of institutional quality. The impact of education on performance continues to be
negative, but assuming H1 + H2 = H, the net effect of H on performance is positive, while that of
capital investment at 28 - 39% is higher than it is in Table 1. Moreover, aGlobe, sGlobe, and average
MIGI (MIGIave) maintain their dominance, while pGlobe, rule of law, participatory and human
rights, as well as the level of economic development, are drags on economic performance. WGI and
MIGI are not perfectly comparable, but they yield consistent estimates insofar as one is willing to
read between the lines.
From Table 3 the health and education components of H keep switching depending on which other
variables are included. Since when negative the effects of H1 and H2 are also statistically
insignificant, the economic meaning of the results is unaltered. However, the explanatory power falls,
in some cases dramatically, so that the constant term is nearly the same size as the mean of the
dependent variable. The same goes for Table 4, only in this case the constant term is biased
downward - way downward.
5. Tentative conclusion
Utilizing a simple production function approach in which economic activity depends on measures of
globalization, governance, and some  controls, this paper estimates and compares the effects of
globalization and governance on the economic performance of 35 SSACs. The analysis finds that both
physical and human capital, as well as unexplained (exogenous) technical residuals, affect economic
performance, although human capital and technical change do not always have a statistically significant
impact. The policy implication of these results calls for improvement in all three variables. Economic
performance also varies with measures of globalization. For instance, aGlobe has a very strong effect.
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However, disaggregating aGlobe reveals that sGlobe and eGlobe have positive effects on economic
performance, while pGlobe has a negative effect. Globalization is good for economic performance,
especially social globalization. 
The quality of institutions are also important to economic performance. Both WGIave and MIGIave
have positive impacts. However, disaggregated, different measures of institutional quality have
different effects on performance. The effects of WGI governance regulatory quality and government
effectiveness are always positive, while freedom of expression and political stability are negative.
According to MIGI governance, the drags on the economic performance of SSACs are safety and
security of property rights, human rights, and the low level of economic development. Overall, the
results of this paper make sense and are credible. However, there remains a need for fine-tuning the
model, increasing the sample, and deploying alternative models and estimation techniques.
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Endnotes
1.The terms “rules of inference” and “transformations” in the manner used here are from
Wayne A. Wickelgren’s How to Solve Mathematical Problems, Dover Publications, Inc.,
1995.
2. See Amavilah’s (2006) comment on AJR at
www.http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=911324.
3. Developing countries essentially trade in land to the extent they export mainly raw
materials.
4.E.G. Siba (2008) makes a good effort of examining the factors that influence
institutional quality in Sub-Saharan Africa.
5.A. Navas-Ruis (2007) provides a theoretical links of trade openness and institutional
change to economic growth.
